On the Measurability of Measurement Standards by Phil Maguire & Rebecca Maguire
403
 Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. XVIII, No. 54, 2018
On the Measurability of 
Measurement Standards
PHIL MAGUIRE and REBECCA MAGUIRE
National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Ireland
Pollock (2004) argues in favour of Wittgenstein’s (1953) claim that the 
standard metre bar in Paris has no metric length: Because the standard 
retains a special status in the system of measurement, it cannot be ap-
plied to itself. However, we argue that Pollock is mistaken regarding the 
feature of the standard metre which supports its special status. While 
the unit markings were arbitrarily designated, the constitution, pres-
ervation and application of the bar have been scientifi cally developed 
to optimize stability, and hence predictive accuracy. We argue that it 
is the ‘hard to improve’ quality of stability that supports the standard’s 
value in measurement, not any of its arbitrary features. And because the 
special status of the prototype is tied to its ability to meet this external 
criterion, the possibility always exists of identifying an alternative, more 
stable, standard, thereby allowing the original standard to be measured. 
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1. Introduction
Wittgenstein (1953: 29, §50) makes the following claim:
“There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is 1 metre long, nor 
that it is not 1 metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris. – But 
this is, of course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only 
to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a metre-
rule.” 
Pollock (2004) argues that this claim is correct. Because the prototype 
metre has a special status in the metric system, it cannot be measured 
within that system. His view is that there is no fundamental unit of 
length beyond the prototype metre. It is not the case that bar was 
selected because it happens to match an a priori concept of the me-
tre. Rather, the bar is the essence of the metre and measuring metric 
length does not make sense without it.
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According to Pollock (2004: 153), “measurement consists in nothing 
more than the comparison of the object of measurement with some (ar-
bitrarily chosen) standard”. In other words, the value of measurement 
comes not from some intrinsically meaningful process of evaluation, 
but from a process of comparison enabled by an arbitrary standard. 
When we ask “how long is that object?” we are not seeking informa-
tion about its true length, whatever that might mean. After all, we can 
see exactly how long the object is. What we want to know is how its 
length compares with that of other objects, a comparison process which 
requires some arbitrarily selected standard for quantifying length, be 
it metres, feet, hands or fi ngers. Pollock explains that “measurement 
simply consists in determining the ratio of one object’s length to the 
length of some standard”. Wittgenstein (1953: 103, §279) makes a re-
lated observation, highlighting the meaninglessness of measurement 
without comparison:
“Imagine someone saying: ‘But I know how tall I am!’ and laying his hand 
on top of his head to prove it.”
Taking another example, somebody might step outside on a warm day 
and exclaim “I wonder how hot it is?” Clearly they can feel how hot the 
air is, it’s touching their skin. But measurement is not about providing 
independent, theory-free descriptions of phenomena, it’s about relating 
things together. What this person wants to know is how the air tem-
perature today compares with that of previous days. In sum, the utility 
of measurement comes about, not from the result of the measurement 
itself, but from the comparisons it enables.
Pollock (2004: 152) argues that this feature of measurement, a sys-
tem for comparison rather than description, has been lost on the ma-
jority of philosophers: “...philosophers simply [do] not understand the 
concept of measurement”. Salmon (1986: 210) is proposed as epitomis-
ing this confusion:
“...if the reference-fi xer does not know how long S is, he cannot know, and 
cannot even discover how long anything is. Measuring an object’s length 
using S only tells him the ratio of that object’s length to the length of S.”
Also (208):
“If one knows only that the length of the fi rst is n times that of the second 
without knowing how long the second object is, one knows only the propor-
tion between the lengths of the two objects without knowing how long either 
object is.”
Pollock (2004: 149) states that Salmon here demonstrates a failure “to 
understand the very concept of measurement, as well as what it means 
to know the length of something.” There is nothing to the act of mea-
surement beyond expressing relationships between objects. There is 
no absolute scale of measurement, no apodictic system for quantifying 
unit length. And with no natural unit, there is no concept of measure-
ment beyond an arbitrarily selected standard being used to express 
length ratios. For Pollock, that’s all there is to measurement.
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The question “how long is that object?” presupposes a system of mea-
surement involving a standard of comparison. Because the prototype 
metre is a necessary condition for the existence of the metric system, 
the question “how long is the standard metre?” is not a proper question. 
The standard is a criterion for measuring in the metric system, and it 
makes no sense to apply a criterion to itself (Pollock 2004: 155). The 
description of the prototype metre as “one metre long” only functions 
as a name or label, not as the description of a measurable length of the 
object. Pollock (2004) therefore concludes that Wittgenstein is correct: 
We cannot say that the standard metre is a metre in length, or that it 
is not a metre in length.
In summary, Pollock’s (2004) argument hinges on fi rst, the idea that 
the standard metre is identifi ed arbitrarily, and second, that it retains 
a special status in the metric system and so cannot be applied to itself. 
This article investigates whether these two assumptions are valid. In 
brief, we will argue the following: Pollock is correct in assuming that 
there is nothing to the act of measurement beyond expressing relation-
ships between objects. However, he is wrong in assuming that this im-
plies that measurement standards are selected arbitrarily (and hence 
immune to being measured themselves). Not all systems are equally 
capable of expressing relationships in a useful way. Specifi cally, stan-
dards that feature the property of stability are better, because they 
enable superior predictions. Because measurement standards are ob-
ligated to meet the external property of stability, they are susceptible 
to being improved upon, and thus open to being measured themselves. 
Although temporarily enjoying dominant status, working standards do 
not have immunity to being overthrown in the game of measurement. 
Accordingly, Wittgenstein’s statement about the metre bar having no 
measurable length value must be wrong.
2. A Brief History of Length
Before examining Pollock’s (2004) argument, we provide a brief over-
view of the history of the metre and the standard metre bar in Paris.
Measurement standards in medieval Europe varied widely between 
different jurisdictions, which were often little more than single market 
towns. The French revolution in 1789 provided the motivation to abol-
ish the multitude of length measures associated with the ancient ré-
gime and replace them with a new decimal system based on a universal 
and easily replicable standard (Crease 2011).
The new movement towards standardization provoked much de-
bate as to which environmental property could provide a globally rec-
ognizable standard. One proposal was to use the length of a “seconds 
pendulum”, that is, a pendulum which swings through a half-period in 
exactly one second. However, it was soon discovered that the length of 
such a pendulum actually varies from place to place. For example, the 
French astronomer Jean Richer demonstrated a 0.3% difference in this 
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length when calibrated in Cayenne (in French Guiana) versus Paris 
(Crease 2011).
In light of this, the commission for measurement reform eventually 
came to the decision that the new unit of length should be equal to 
one ten-millionth of the distance from the North Pole to the Equator, 
when measured along the meridian passing through Paris. This was a 
concept expressed in a single sentence that everybody on earth could 
agree on. During the surveying process, the commission ordered the 
production of a series of platinum bars based on preliminary calcula-
tions. Following the survey’s completion, the bar with length closest to 
the meridional defi nition was identifi ed. This bar, which subsequently 
became known as the “mètre des archives” was placed in the National 
Archives on June 22nd 1799 (Wikipedia “History of the metric system”, 
2018).
The simple meridional defi nition had been intended to ensure inter-
national reproducibility. In practice, however, nobody was in a rush to 
replicate a survey of the distance between the Equator and North Pole. 
The defi nition was so impractical to verify that it became irrelevant, 
being replaced instead by artefact standards. When it was later es-
tablished that the circumference quadrant was actually 10,019km, as 
opposed to 10,000km, this had no bearing on the use of the metre. The 
use of artefacts was already providing a de facto standard, unconnected 
and arbitrary relative to any other worldly defi nition.
Countries adopting the metre as a legal measure during the 19th 
century purchased standard metre bars with which to calibrate their 
own national standards. These, however, were prone to wearing down 
with use. Because different standard bars in different countries were 
being worn down at different rates, there was no mechanism for verify-
ing whether everybody was adhering to the same standard. In light of 
these diffi culties, an international treaty, known as the Metre Conven-
tion, was signed in Paris on 20th May 1875. An organisation known as 
the Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (BIPM) was established 
in Sèvres, just outside Paris. This organization was entrusted with the 
responsibility of conserving prototypes and carrying out regular com-
parisons between different national standards, so as to ensure interna-
tional consensus.
The BIPM set about creating a new state of the art international 
prototype metre, accompanied by a set of copies earmarked for interna-
tional distribution. These bars were made of a special alloy, consisting 
of 90% platinum and 10% iridium, making them signifi cantly harder 
than pure platinum. They were also fashioned in the shape of an X, 
thus minimizing the effects of torsional strain during length compari-
sons.
One of these bars was “sanctioned” to be identical in length to the 
mètre des archives on September 28th 1889, during the fi rst meeting of 
the Conférence Générale des Poids et Mesures (CGPM). Following this 
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moment of consecration, the new bar became the international proto-
type metre, and the old 1799 bar began to fl uctuate in length.
In 1960, at the 11th CGPM, a new defi nition of the metre was agreed, 
based on wavelengths of radiation from the krypton-86 atom. In 1983, 
at the 17th CGPM meeting, the metre was redefi ned again in terms of 
the distance travelled by light in a vacuum per second.
For the purpose of analysing the validity of Wittgenstein’s original 
claim and Pollock’s (2004) defence of it, we will initially consider the 
role of the 1889 metre bar as an active standard, as it was in 1953 when 
Wittgenstein’s comments were fi rst published.
3. Length versus Unit
Pollock (2004) repeatedly emphasises that the selection of the standard 
is arbitrary, meaning that it is completely self-suffi cient and has no 
connection with any external phenomena: The “standard is arbitrarily 
chosen and agreed upon by the community. Only practical consider-
ations bar us from using anything at all as a standard” (154). Also: 
“This arbitrary nature of standards of measurement seems to be lost on 
many philosophers” (154).
Intuitively, the selection of prototypes by the BIPM does not seem 
arbitrary. For example, the prototype kilogram is deliberately forged 
of platinum-iridium alloy, an inert metal with very high density (to 
negate a buoyancy effect), extreme resistance to oxidation, low mag-
netic susceptibility and high resistance to contamination and wear. In 
addition, the artefact is carefully isolated under multiple nested bell 
jars and subject to periodic cleaning with ether and ethanol followed by 
steaming with bi-distilled water (Wikipedia “Kilogram”, 2018). When 
Pollock describes the prototype metre as arbitrary, he is referring, not 
to its material, preservation and application, but to the markings on 
that bar which designate one metre. It is the designation of a unit that 
is arbitrary. 
But what is the size of that unit? We propose that the size of the 
unit does not exist independently of the medium of the platinum-iridi-
um bar onto which it is inscribed. The bar does the work of preserving 
the size of the unit, rendering the concepts of ‘unit’ and ‘standard’ inex-
tricable. Asserting that the unit is arbitrary is therefore meaningless: 
there is no unit that can be addressed independently of its embodiment 
by the metre bar itself. 
All measurement units depend on an underlying standard which 
embodies their size. For example, the Imperial and metric systems 
were originally associated with different processes for realizing their 
respective units. However, by 1964, the defi nition of the inch was tied 
to that of the metre, meaning that both units serve as different labels 
for describing measurements in the same fundamental system. To turn 
a measurement from centimetres to inches, one simply divides by 2.54. 
Although this ratio is one that arose by historical chance, it has no 
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measurement value in itself, serving merely as a cosmetic treatment of 
an underlying measurement result. The value of both the Imperial and 
metric systems lies in the embodiment of unit length by a standard.
Pollock (2004) misses the idea that the size of a unit must be real-
ized by some sophisticated practice, believing instead that the concept 
of objective length is universally appreciated following its ‘discovery’: 
“Although we discovered the concepts of length (and mass) we invented 
the concept of a metre for our own convenience; as a means of making 
judgments about length, which we could record and/or communicate to 
others” (154). Thus, for Pollock, the aspect of the prototype metre that 
gives it its special status in the metric system is not its role in enabling 
reliable judgments about length, but merely its role in designating a 
unit of measurement. In the following section we argue that Pollock’s 
attitude overlooks a crucial property of measurement standards, name-
ly that of stability.
4. What Makes the Standard Special?
Let’s imagine what would happen if the only role of the metre bar was 
to designate a unit of measurement, as Pollock (2004) assumes, with-
out any regard to realizing the size of that unit.
Under this scenario units of length could be perfectly replicated and 
maintained by any measured object. For example, I could take a wood-
en stick and mark on it exactly the same unit lengths as exist on the 
prototype metre bar. In Pollock’s world the stick functions just as well 
as the original standard. Indeed, every act of measurement is equiva-
lent to forging a new standard. Once my desk is identifi ed as having 
some particular length value, it too becomes part of the standard, and, 
following the assumptions inherent to Pollock’s view, ceases to have 
measurable length because of its new special role in the system. The 
original standard is not special anymore. We can no longer cling to 
Wittgenstein’s statement that only one thing has no measurable length 
value: Every object which is measured becomes just as good at realizing 
length as the original standard, hence losing its property of measurable 
length. Pollock doesn’t care what object the markings are made on. Af-
ter all, the choice is arbitrary.
In practice, measurement does not work like this. The standard 
encompasses, not just the physical bar, but a whole set of procedures 
for handling, comparing and making copies of the bar, as well as the 
background knowledge and assumptions involved in those procedures. 
For example, in 1927 the defi ned mise en pratique of the prototype me-
tre was altered, without affecting the prototype artefact, or its unit 
markings. At the 7th CGPM it was clarifi ed that any measurement of 
the bar should now be “subject to standard atmospheric pressure, with 
the prototype supported on two cylinders of at least one centimetre 
diameter, symmetrically placed in the same horizontal plane at a dis-
tance of 571 mm from each other” (BIPM 1928: 49). The preservation 
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of a given measurement standard resides in the understanding of its 
mise en pratique by active practitioners; used improperly the metre bar 
might prove no more useful in measurement than a metre stick.
If we accept that some artefacts and procedures enable superior 
judgements about length (e.g. a platinum-iridium bar, when used in 
appropriate manner, makes a better standard than a stick) then we 
are admitting the existence of some external criterion that standards 
are intended to meet. 
Consider, for example, a fanatical dictator who issues a diktat de-
fi ning the length of his beard as the new standard for measurement. 
Relying on this unstable beard length might cause bridges to fall down, 
buildings to collapse, and ships to sink. 
Is this a problem? If we maintain that a standard of length can be 
selected arbitrarily, then it has no obligations to achieve anything. It 
is only relative to the external goal-directed expectation that measure-
ment standards should keep bridges up and ships afl oat that we can 
describe the beard-length standard as wanting. In sum, an arbitrary 
standard, without external connection to any practical function, does 
not support the property that we intuitively understand as length.
Danjon (1929) highlights the diffi culty of interpreting the ephem-
eris time standard (using the position of the sun, moon, planets and 
stars) as a fi at with no external obligations:
…Although Newton’s law has been saved, it is experiencing a quite extraor-
dinary adventure: henceforth called upon to gauge the passage of time, it 
becomes in part unverifi able and ceases to be what could strictly be termed 
a law…Since we would ask these laws to provide a measure for the passage 
of time, we could no longer subject them to experimental control without 
entering into a vicious circle. (Danjon 1929)
Consistent with Danjon’s critique, Chang (2001, 2004, 2007), van Fras-
sen (2008, 2009) and Tal (2011, 2012, 2013, 2016) all reject the tradi-
tional view of arbitrary, apodictic defi nitions at the heart of measure-
ment. Acknowledging the real-world application of measurement, they 
recognise the role of a ‘hard-to-isolate’ external criterion, supporting 
goal-directed activities, as being at the heart of the practice. 
5. What is Measurement For?
To properly understand the role of the prototype metre in the metric 
system we need to consider what measurement is for in the fi rst place. 
Intuitively, people make measurements because measurements are 
valuable. But what is it about measurements that makes them useful? 
Tal (2012, 2013, 2016) proposes that the goal of prediction lies at the 
heart of measurement, insofar as measurement accuracy, and hence 
the calibration of scientifi c instruments, is defi ned in terms of predic-
tive accuracy. When I measure the length of my desk I am effectively 
making a prediction about what will happen when it interacts with 
other measured objects (e.g. will my desk fi t through that door?) Even 
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if we imagine cases where measurement is carried out for its own sake, 
without any expectations for prediction, the concept of reliable relation-
ships still applies. For example, somebody who measures how fast they 
run around a race track expects those timings to enable comparisons 
involving other runners, suggesting who would win a hypothetical race 
between them. In order to be of value, a measurement system must 
provide reliable information about the relationships between measured 
phenomena, information which enables accurate predictions.
Tal’s (2012) goal-based view stands in contrast to the widespread 
supposition that measurement and prediction are distinct epistemic ac-
tivities. He argues that traditional accounts of measurement have over-
looked its practical role in prediction, ignoring the key associated con-
cepts of uncertainty, reliability and inference. For example, theorists 
such as Campbell, Stevens and Suppes “took ‘measurement’ to be syn-
onymous with either ‘number assignment’ or ‘scale construction’, and 
neglected the ‘applied’ aspects of measurement such as accuracy, preci-
sion, error, uncertainty, and calibration” Tal (2013: 1164). In practice, 
measurement outcomes are obtained from instrumental readings by a 
chain of inferences, and the inferences drawn depend on the particular 
theoretical and statistical assumptions associated with the measure-
ment apparatus. According to Tal (2013: 1165), “this way of viewing 
measurement raises a host of representational questions that have been 
either neglected or only partially addressed by traditional accounts”.
The idea that measurement might be goal-directed raises the issue 
of how a theoretical quantifi cation could be coordinated with empiri-
cal measurement. The issue here is that the empirical adequacy of a 
given theory and the reliability of a related measurement process ap-
pear to depend on each other in a circular fashion (Tal 2013: 1160). 
For example, in order to establish a theory of weight, it is necessary to 
test the predictions of that theory, a task which itself requires a reli-
able method of measuring weights. Conversely, testing the reliability of 
such measurements presupposes existing theoretical knowledge about 
weight against which it can be calibrated (Tal 2013: 1160). 
The traditional philosophical approach to this problem, which Pol-
lock (2004) espouses, has been to assume that coordination is achieved, 
and circularity avoided, by establishing apodictic defi nitions for quan-
tifi cation, which are arbitrary, self-supporting and internally complete. 
These defi nitions are assumed to be “analytic statements that require 
no empirical testing” (Tal 2013: 1160), thus severing the link between 
measurement and any external goal-directed outcome, such as predic-
tion. For example, Ernst Mach noted that different types of fl uid ex-
pand at different nonlinearly related rates when heated and concluded 
that there can be no fact of the matter as to which fl uid expands most 
uniformly, since the very notion of equality among temperature inter-
vals has itself no determinate application prior to a conventional choice 
of standard thermometric fl uid with which to establish it (Tal 2013: 
1161). The eventual choice of standard, for Mach, was a convention-
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al one. Poincaré similarly argued that the processes scientists use to 
mark equal time durations (e.g. pendulum swings) are chosen for the 
sake of convenience (Tal 2013: 1161).
Pollock (2004: 155) echoes a similar conventionalist sentiment when 
he insists that “we simply chose a length that we found convenient and 
called it a metre. That is all there is to choosing a standard of meas-
urement.” However, though the examples noted by Mach and Poincaré 
seem, at fi rst blush, to indicate arbitrariness at the heart of measure-
ment, this arbitrariness results from pushing measurement beyond the 
existing limits of science and technology, thereby exhausting justifi ca-
tion. The arbitrary decision here is to choose between several highly 
sophisticated systems, each of which does so well at measuring that 
their various merits are hard to distinguish.
For instance, while Mach and Poincaré recognized that choices of 
coordinative principles are often constrained by considerations of sim-
plicity and convenience, they were not suggesting that these choices 
are completely arbitrary, but rather that working standards are select-
ed because they are “good enough” to provide useful practical reference 
(see Galison 2003), an attitude subsequently adopted by the BIPM.
6. Stability
Metrology is the science of measurement and standardization, carried 
out by metrologists, who are experts in highly reliable measurement. 
Despite the fact that it is an independent discipline with its own jour-
nals and controversies, the methods and tools of metrology have re-
ceived little attention from philosophers (Tal 2011: 1083). A central 
philosophical question in metrology is how the process of standardiza-
tion works. What exactly is it that metrologists are doing to develop 
and maintain accurate standards of measurement? How are these 
methods justifi ed from an epistemic perspective and how do they re-
solve the apparent circularity of theoretical quantifi cation and empiri-
cal measurement? 
Chang (2001, 2004, 2007) and van Fraassen (2008, 2009) argue 
that the apparent circularity is not vicious. According to their view, 
constructing a quantity concept and standardizing its measurement 
are co-dependent, iterative tasks. With each iteration the quantity 
concept is re-coordinated to a more stable set of standards, which al-
lows theoretical predictions to be tested more precisely, facilitating the 
subsequent development of standards, and so forth (Tal 2013: 1162). 
This corresponds with the BIPM’s view of their own standards, which 
are not intended as absolute but rather based on a ‘mise en pratique’, 
that is, a set of instructions allowing the unit to be realized in practice 
with the highest level of accuracy. The difference between this view 
and the traditional philosophical approach is that it does not seek to 
resolve circularity through absolutism. Rather, it treats the standard 
as a working realization of an external criterion known in metrology 
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as ‘stability’.
Stability refers to the tendency of an apparatus to produce the 
‘same’ measurement outcome over repeated runs, as well as replicat-
ing the outcomes of similar instruments around the globe. What this 
means in practice is that discerning any predictable fl uctuation in a 
standard should be as hard as possible; the standard should be as un-
correlated as possible with any changes in the environment. This is the 
external criterion that measurement standards are designed to meet. 
Under the guidance of the BIPM, a worldwide network of metrological 
institutions is responsible for comparing, adjusting, maintaining, dis-
seminating and refi ning stable standards (Tal 2016: 297). 
One of the notable successes of these institutions is the standard 
measure of time used in almost every scientifi c context, known as Co-
ordinated Universal Time (UTC) (Tal 2016: 297). UTC is regarded as 
overwhelmingly stable insofar as a variety of standardization labs 
around the world manage to closely reproduce it on an ongoing basis. 
Standardization can be regarded as a process for ensuring independent 
agreement: Despite being displaced in space and time, and having no 
causal interaction with each other, the labs can produce results which 
agree with each other. In other words, they are able to make highly 
accurate predictions about the measurements that other labs will re-
port each day. Metrologists labour relentlessly to identify standards 
that support greater predictive accuracy. If standards were chosen ar-
bitrarily, as Pollock (2004) maintains, the world would have no need 
for metrologists.
As regards the prototype metre bar, its value comes, not from those 
features which have been selected arbitrarily, but from those which 
have been carefully calibrated to maximise stability. The standard re-
fl ects the realisation of centuries of accumulated theoretical and techno-
logical efforts, involving the identifi cation of materials that best support 
predictive accuracy under varying conditions. Contrary to Pollock’s un-
derstanding, the metre bar’s utility is not related to its ability to desig-
nate a unit of length. After all, anyone could just as well hold their two 
fi ngers in the air, refer to the distance between them, and say “this is 
the length of a metre”. Designating an arbitrary distance is easy, but 
to be rendered useful, the size of that unit must be preserved by some 
stable standard. The utility that the prototype metre bar provides lies in 
its capacity to maintain and replicate that designated distance.
7. Measuring the Standard
In sum, measurement and stabilization are one and the same concept. 
To measure a property such as length is to stabilize it relative to a stan-
dard which can reliably preserve that property, thus enabling accurate 
predictions to be made. Stability is the backbone of measurement util-
ity, and working standards merely approach that ideal without ever 
realizing it completely.
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We return now to the original question of whether the prototype 
metre bar has measurable length. We have argued that what makes 
measurement standards valuable is their capacity to enable reliable 
judgements about length, and hence support accurate predictions. If a 
standard has been designed to meet an external goal-based criterion, 
this opens up the possibility of improving the standard and replacing 
it with a more stable version, thus allowing the original system to be 
measured. Because stability relates to external events and relation-
ships, no standard can ever represent the fi nal word on stability. As 
soon as we identify measurement value as being related to stability, 
we recognize that working standards provide a useful, yet incomplete 
representation of the concept of measurement.
A continuing trend in metrology is to eliminate as many as possible 
of the artefact standards, and instead defi ne practical units of mea-
surement in terms of fundamental physical constants. As of writing, 
the only remaining artefact standard is the International Prototype 
Kilo (IPK), shortly to be replaced, like that of the other BIPM base 
units, by a defi nition entirely based on fundamental constants.
For example, the metre bar prototype was offi cially superseded in 
1960, at the 11th CGPM, when a new defi nition was agreed based pure-
ly on a universally replicable mise en pratique.  Specifi cally, the metre 
was redefi ned as equal to 1,650,763.73 wavelengths in a vacuum of 
the radiation corresponding to the transition between the levels 2p10 
and 5d5 of the krypton-86 atom. This new defi nition democratised and 
diversifi ed the materialization of standards, by allowing anyone with 
the appropriate lab equipment to realize the metre for themselves. In-
creasing levels of scientifi c sophistication and greater levels of shared 
practical knowledge between metrologists have obviated the need for a 
remaining link to a localised artefact.
It should be noted that the shift from artefact to decentralized stan-
dards has not changed the practicalities of metrology any more than 
the de jure abandonment of the gold standard in 1976 changed the 
nature of international economics. In practice, the Parisian artefact 
standards were rarely consulted. The only comparison of national stan-
dards with the international prototype was carried out over a 15 year 
period between 1921 and 1936, revealing a variability of around 0.2 μm 
(Nelson 1981). Like the gold standard, the role of artefact standards 
was chiefl y to shore up confi dence in the system as a whole. As scien-
tifi c knowledge became more widespread, sophisticated and intercon-
nected, this role was no longer necessary.
The defi nitions of decentralized standards, just like artefact stan-
dards, involve an arbitrary component which is needed to establish a 
convenient unit quantity. For example, in the krypton-86 standard, the 
value “1,650,763.73” was selected so as to ensure historical continuity 
with the preceding defi nition. The number is arbitrary, insofar as any 
other number would work just as well. However, as previously argued, 
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the number by itself does not provide utility. Instead, it’s the stabil-
ity of krypton radiation wavelengths that supports reliable judgements 
about length.
The issue of standards being vulnerable to measurement applies 
just as equally to decentralized standards as it does to localized arte-
fact standards. In order to maintain their status, measurement stan-
dards are obligated to deliver reliable judgements, and to support ac-
curate predictions. When competitors can gain an advantage using an 
alternative system, a working standard immediately loses its status.
The new BIPM base units, which tie base units to fundamental 
constants, state ideal conditions that cannot be realized by a material 
object or process, only by an abstract entity, these conditions can be 
approached more and more closely in practice, yet never perfectly real-
ized (e.g. achieving a perfect vacuum to measure the speed of light). Ac-
cordingly, the realization of standards is left entirely open and prone to 
change when metrologists discover new physical principles that make 
it possible to materialize the unit with greater stability than before.
Just as with artefact standards, the incomplete understanding of 
stability leaves decentralized standards perennially vulnerable to re-
fi nement.
8. Conclusion
Pollock’s (2004) argument begins promisingly, with the observation 
that the utility of measurement stems from its capacity to support com-
parisons, and not from providing absolute, theory-free descriptions. 
However, he makes a critical error by falling back into the trap of ab-
solutism, assuming that the concept of length is ‘objectively’ known, as 
opposed to something whose practical realization we must work relent-
lessly towards.
The prototype metre in Paris was selected by metrologists as a use-
ful working standard because it did a good job. It was never intended 
as the absolute, inviolable defi nition of the metre. Pollock’s (2004) ar-
guments regarding the irreproachable role of the metre standard are 
directly undermined by the BIPM’s 1960 declaration from the 11th 
CGPM, according to which “the international prototype does not defi ne 
the metre with an accuracy adequate for the present needs of metrol-
ogy” (Tal 2011: 1082–1083). If the metre bar was really the foundation 
of measurement, how could its accuracy ever be found lacking?
Pollock (2004) overlooks the crucial idea that measurement is a 
goal-directed activity based on clear external objectives, and thus open 
to continuing refi nement. When a system asserts its own supremacy, 
it severs any ties to delivering in practice, and the system ceases to 
have utility. For instance, any measurement standard which is beyond 
reproach, such as the dictator’s beard, cannot measure at all, because 
it is freed of any responsibility to provide practical results in the real 
world. To be useful, a measurement standard must hold the potential 
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to be found lacking—to be measurable—by some alternative system 
which delivers superior results in practice. Thus, while current mea-
surement standards do a great job, they do not completely defi ne what 
we demand of measurement.
For example, in 1988, the International Prototype Kilogram (IPK), 
which continues to serve as the standard for mass, was removed from 
its vault in Paris. It was found that the mass of the prototype had drift-
ed downwards relative to the set of national copies distributed glob-
ally in 1884, at a rate of change of about 0.5 parts per billion per year 
(Crease, 2011). By defi nition, the prototype has no measured value, 
and hence no measured error. From this frame of reference, the copies 
around the world are gaining mass. However, because that is a clearly 
counterproductive interpretation, the BIPM ‘inferred’ that the proto-
type must be unstable and somehow losing mass, thus making an im-
plicit comparison of the mass of the IPK to some more stable reference 
frame.
In conclusion, Wittgenstein’s original claim regarding the measur-
ability of the prototype metre must be mistaken. The prototype holds 
its status as a standard, not because it has been arbitrarily singled 
out as having a special role in some language game, but because it 
delivers results in practice which are hard to beat. Measurement stan-
dards should thus be interpreted as well-established recommendations 
for how to achieve the best possible measurement results given the 
current state of technology. As soon as we succumb to the assumption 
that standards somehow encapsulate the foundations of measurement 
itself, and are thus immune to reproach, we cease to be engaged in 
measurement.
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